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Chasing the Climate Change Momentum: Linking DOD’s Operational Energy Program 
Recommendations for the Department of Defense 
 
 Fuel is the lifeblood of U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) operations and 
capability, without which, ships, planes, aircraft and weapons systems would cease to 
function. As a voracious oil consumer, protecting energy security, specifically 
operational energy, defined as the energy required for training, moving and sustaining 
military forces and weapons specifically for military operations, is critical. In 2009, 
Congress intervened with mandates directed at the Defense Department to create an 
executive level office of Operational Energy Policy and Programs. This program and the 
resulting two department strategies, in 2011 and 2016, ignited an energy conscious 
mindset across the Service branches and led to many energy innovations. During this 
time, the DOD also recognized the implications and growing national security threat from 
climate change. In both the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, climate change 
and energy security were inextricably linked. But while climate change preparations, via 
adaptation and mitigation of infrastructure, have been persistent within the DOD, the 
momentum behind operational energy has stalled.  The focus has cooled as a result of a 
changed global energy landscape, a less supportive administration prioritizing fossil fuel 
interests over green renewables, and lagging institutional commitment.  This paper 
recommends the DOD fashion a more visible and concrete connection between energy 
security, climate change and national security. While politics and current administration 
rhetoric make this challenging, the DOD has successfully proved it can insulate itself 
from the noise in order to protect national security. 
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 It takes millions of barrels of oil to feed the machinery of war.  In fiscal year 2017 
alone, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that it consumed over 85 million 
barrels of fuel to power ships, aircraft, combat vehicles and contingency bases at a cost of 
nearly $8.2 billion.1  Without this critical resource, DOD operations would grind to a halt.  
For the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, fuel is the lifeblood that keeps planes in the 
air, convoys on the ground, ships at sea, and weapons systems functioning.  And though 
it is a necessity, fuel is expensive, bulky, and slow to transport requiring special 
procedures and equipment for acquisition, shipment, storage and distribution.2  In 
peacetime and at war, the United States has been and continues to be the world’s largest 
consumer of oil.3  Within the U.S. alone, the DOD accounts for most of the energy 
consumed by the federal government.4  For decades, this dependency on foreign oil has 
had far-reaching national security implications impacting U.S. alliances, military basing, 
and foreign policy entanglements.  Much of America’s foreign and defense policies have 
been defined by decisions to place America’s military in locations around the globe to 
ensure the unimpeded flow of oil.  This paper will explore the concept of energy security 
through the lens of DOD5, specifically operational energy, which accounts for 
																																																								
1 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Fiscal Year 2017 Operational 
Energy Annual Report (2018). 
2 James P. Stucker, John F. Schank, Bonnie Dombey-Moore, Assessment of DoD Fuel Standardization 
Policies, RAND REPORT (1994). 
3 What countries are the top producers and consumers of oil?, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6 (last updated Dec. 3, 2018). 
4 U.S. federal government energy costs at lowest point since 2004, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, Oct. 2, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33152. 
5 Id. (For purposes of policy, energy usage within the DOD is divided into two areas: installation (or 
facility) energy and operational (or mobility) energy. Installation energy is the energy required to run and 
operate military installations, comprising nearly 300,000 buildings, accounting for 30 percent of DOD’s 
total energy use.) 
	 2 
approximately 70 percent of total DOD energy use.6  Operational energy (hereinafter OE) 
is the energy required for training, moving and sustaining military forces and weapons 
specifically for military operations.7  The U.S. has been engaged in overseas contingency 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last eighteen years, and continues to support 
missions in Djibouti, Africa and (for now) Syria.  The impacts involved, both in terms of 
transportation and lives, of getting fuel to these forces on the frontlines are complicated 
and costly.   
 Closely tied to this broader discussion of energy security is climate change.  The 
DOD and national security agencies of the federal government have repeatedly 
recognized climate change as a national security threat.8  In 2010 the DOD’s Quadrennial 
Defense Review declared that climate change and energy security were inextricably 
linked and would play significant roles in the future security environment.9  This inter-
relationship is complicated however, by the current U.S. administration’s position on 
climate change, with President Trump being a well-known skeptic.  Yet despite his 
Administration’s efforts to roll back environmental laws designed to curb greenhouse 
gases (a known contributor and accelerant of global warming10), the DOD has long 
recognized and accounted for climate change impacts in its overall policy and planning.   
																																																								
6	Rebecca George, Defense Department energy use falls to lowest level since at least 1975, U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, Feb. 5, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19871.	
7 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
ANNUAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT AND RESILIENCE REPORT (AMERR) FY2017 (2018). 
8 Michelle Melton, Climate Change and National Security, Part I: What is the Threat, When’s It Coming, 
and How Bad Will it Be? LAWFARE Blog, Nov. 19, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-
and-national-security-part-i-what-threat-whens-it-coming-and-how-bad-will-it-be 
9 DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (2010). 
http://archive.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf. 
10 FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME II IMPACTS, Risks and Adaptation in the United 
States, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM (2018). 
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 While DOD and Congressional attention are focused on mitigating climate change 
impacts, the momentum behind operational energy efforts has stalled in recent years.  
After just a decade in practice, the program has been negatively impacted by a lack of 
coordinated executive leadership, a cultural aversion to “green” efficiency, and recent 
competition for resources by larger DOD readiness priorities.  Other factors contributing 
to this stalled momentum include the drawdown in military forces overseas and the 
decreasing price of oil, which have led some to question the need for continued 
commitment to energy efficiency goals, particularly those critics who view energy 
conservation as too costly and a detractor from capability.   
 Though OE has slipped from the Department’s list of priorities, it should remain 
there given DOD’s increasing aggregate demand for fuel (Navy and Air Force 
specifically), fuel intensity, and its growing expeditionary asset consumption.11  
Moreover, the number of projects already invested in energy efficiency and the fact that 
global supplies and availability of oil are always precarious are reason enough to keep 
OE high on stakeholders’ agendas.  There are steps that DOD can take to keep OE 
relevant and on track to meeting the goals outlined in the Department’s strategies, 
assuming the political will is there.  This paper recommends the OE program and future 
strategy (anticipated in 2021 per Congressional mandate) should more closely align itself 
with climate change.  In this way, the program can harness the momentum and attention 
surrounding that issue while supporting the natural fit with energy security.  
Roadmap 
 Up until 2008, the military had focused its efforts against globalized threats and 
fighting wars with some awareness but no real action toward addressing the systemic 
																																																								
11 Interview with James Caley, Director for Operational Energy, Department of the Navy (Mar. 22, 2019). 
	 4 
problems that energy security played.  But it became clear that ignoring the energy issue 
left the military highly vulnerable and was no longer a prudent course of action.12  The 
issue of fuel, particularly the cost and availability of petroleum-based fuels, significantly 
impacts DOD in all respects—military budgets, combat mission execution, institutional 
capabilities, and by implication, U.S. national security.13  This paper will review DOD’s 
energy security evolution, particularly focusing on the last decade when the OE strategies 
have been in effect.  Section one will define energy security and OE through the lens of 
DOD’s mission—protecting national security, and examine the operational and strategic 
implications of OE generally.  Section two will review the history of DOD efforts to 
recognize and address energy security by looking at studies and the Congressional 
mandates to implement energy efficiency into its business practices.  Section three will 
introduce the two Operational Energy strategies published in 2011 and 2016.  Section 
four will examine the Department’s overall progress toward achieving that balance of 
mission-oriented policy and energy conscious goals in line with the OE strategies.  
Section five will introduce the DOD’s climate change adaptation roadmap, introduced in 
2014, and examine the nexus of issues related to climate change, energy security and 
national security.  Section six will then focus on the Trump Administration’s actions and 
views related to energy policy and climate change broadly, and how these policies could 
impact DOD’s future progress in implementing its strategy, offering recommendations 
for the way forward.  Section seven will review the main points of the paper in 
perspective and provide concluding remarks. 
 
																																																								
12 Jerry Warner and Peter W. Singer, FUELING THE BALANCE: A DEFENSE ENERGY STRATEGY PRIMER, 
Foreign Policy Paper Series, Aug. 25, 2009. 
13 Id. 
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Section 1: Energy Security and OE through the Lens of the DOD mission   
 The DOD’s enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces 
needed to deter war and protect the security of the nation.14  Should deterrence fail, the 
Joint Force must be prepared to fight and win.  This means taking the fight anywhere, at 
anytime.  This agile and adaptable force is necessary not only for national security, but 
also to respond to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts around the globe.  To 
do any of these missions, the DOD must be confident in its energy security.  Defined by 
law, energy security means “having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the 
ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet mission essential requirements.”15  
Thus, energy is the fundamental enabler of military capability, without which, there is 
virtually no capability.16 
 The term operational energy is also defined by statute as the “energy required for 
training, moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military 
operations,” and includes energy used by ships, aircraft, combat vehicles, and tactical 
power generators.17  For the military commander at sea, a steady supply of energy (i.e. 
petroleum or biofuel blend) can extend deployment periods and reduce the number of 
dangerous replenishment operations.  For the Air Force, operational energy means 
aviation fuel efficiency and navigating the complex logistical and technical challenges to 
getting fuel to the warfighter.  For the military commander on the ground, energy is 
																																																								
14 DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (2018). 
15 10 U.S.C. § 101(e)(7) (2018). 
16 DEP’T OF DEF., OPERATIONAL ENERGY ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2018). 
17 10 U.S.C. § 2926 (2018). 
	 6 
tactically relevant.18  It fuels combat operations, powers forward operating bases (FOBs), 
and requires manpower to protect and deliver this liquid lifeline.  
 Petroleum-based liquid fuels are DOD’s largest source of energy, accounting for 
approximately two thirds of its energy consumption.19  When fuel use is divided by 
service, the Air Force is the largest user; when divided by platform type, aircraft are the 
largest user.20  Thus, more than 90 percent of today’s operational energy goes to fueling 
platforms, aircraft, ships and land vehicles.21  More than 75 percent of total operational 
energy is consumed by aircraft alone.22   
A.  Operational Energy: Operational and Strategic Implications 
 Energy has significant operational, strategic, and budgetary implications.  
Operational challenges and risks relate to the diversion of resources away from combat to 
protect and move fuel to the battlefield, as well as the vulnerability of fuel supply lines to 
disruption.23  Apart from food, fuel is the largest operational sustainment demand at the 
organizational level of war.24  The other significant consumer of fuel and energy in the 
battlespace is at FOBs in the form of electric generators.25  Often resembling a small 
college campus, FOBs are staging grounds in overseas locations for direct military 
																																																								
18 Department of Defense Report to Congress on Energy Security Initiatives, DOD ENERGY SECURITY 
TASK FORCE (2008). 
19 See DEP’T OF DEF., OPERATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY (2011) (Military deployments generally rely on 
petroleum-based fuels.  In current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, jet fuel (JP-8 or JP-5 on ships) is the 
most prevalent battlefield fuel.) 
20 MOSHE SCHWARTZ, KATHERINE BLAKELEY, RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42558, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENERGY INITIATIVES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2012). 
21 Id. 
22 See MILITARY ADVISORY BD., CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, ADVANCED ENERGY AND U.S. NATIONAL 
SECURITY, (2017), https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2017-U-015512.pdf. 
23 MOSHE SCHWARTZ, KATHERINE BLAKELEY, RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42558, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENERGY INITIATIVES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, (2012). 
24 Greg Douquet, Unleash Us From the Tether of Fuel – Innovation in energy can be a force multiplier on 
the battlefield, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, Jan. 11, 2017. 
25 See MILITARY ADVISORY BD., CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, POWERING AMERICA’S DEFENSE: ENERGY 
AND THE RISKS TO NATIONAL SECURITY (2009), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/MAB_2-FINAL.pdf. 
	 7 
engagement.  They contain everything from communications infrastructure and living 
quarters to administrative areas, eating facilities and industrial activities necessary to 
maintain combat systems.26  All of these facilities require electricity, provided primarily 
by towed-in generators.27  The fuel used by these generators comes from the same 
vulnerable supply chain that provides liquid fuel.28  Fuel also comes with a host of hidden 
costs in terms of storage, security and building materials.  In Afghanistan, U.S. forces not 
only paid for the infrastructure to keep and store fuel, but also enlarged the bases’ 
perimeter in order to do so.29  Yet again this meant diverting combat forces to protect the 
increased base footprint, at the expense of using those forces to directly engage the 
enemy.30 
 Though operational energy issues impact all branches of the DOD, it was the 
impacts felt by the Army and Marine Corps ground units in Iraq and Afghanistan at the 
height of the war that led to change.  When asked at a Brookings Institution meeting in 
2007 about what was the most important area of research that was needed to aid his men 
and women, Marine General James Mattis responded, “Unleash us from the tether of 
fuel.”31  No other quote comes close to encapsulating the frustration felt by the dozens of 
military commanders that served and led troops in those deployed environments at that 
time.  From their perspective, reducing fuel demand could remove convoys from the 
battlespace, reduce operational vulnerability, and free up combat forces for other 
																																																								
26 See MILITARY ADVISORY BD., CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, POWERING AMERICA’S DEFENSE: ENERGY 
AND THE RISKS TO NATIONAL SECURITY (2009), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/MAB_2-FINAL.pdf. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Greg Douquet, Unleash Us From the Tether of Fuel – Innovation in energy can be a force multiplier on 
the battlefield, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, Jan. 11, 2017. 
31 Jerry Warner and Peter W. Singer, FUELING THE BALANCE: A DEFENSE ENERGY STRATEGY PRIMER, 
Foreign Policy Paper Series, Aug. 25, 2009. 
	 8 
missions.  This combat efficiency would then translate into greater endurance, lives 
saved, and actually extend the battlespace by enabling forces to travel longer distances 
and remain concealed longer without refueling.32  
 The strategic implications of DOD’s fuel consumption concern the logistics of 
getting fuel to the overseas operating areas and ensuring the global free flow of oil.33  It is 
this latter concern that drives U.S. national security policy as nations around the world 
increasingly compete for the same energy resources.  In 2008, the Defense Science 
Board34 (DSB) reported that the U.S. imported 60 percent of its oil from foreign sources 
and that the percentage was increasing.  The report highlighted several problems 
associated with this dependence, namely that the U.S. felt forced to placate those oil-rich 
countries to maintain friendly relations for the purposes of this quid pro quo.  
Unfortunately, much of the global petroleum reserves at that time were in countries that 
were either not friendly to the U.S. or held contrary political values.35  At worse, some of 
the countries that the U.S. maintained friendly relationships with were known to support 
extremist groups.36  To say that U.S. oil dependence complicates foreign policy is an 
understatement.  The DSB concluded that in effect, through its imports of oil the U.S. 
funded both sides of the global war on terror.37  Thus, as long as U.S. forces rely on large 
																																																								
32	Department of Defense Report to Congress on Energy Security Initiatives, DOD ENERGY SECURITY 
TASK FORCE (2008). 
33 MOSHE SCHWARTZ, KATHERINE BLAKELEY, RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42558, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENERGY INITIATIVES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2012). 
34 History of the Defense Science Board, https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/history.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 
2019).  Established in 1956, the DSB serves as the Federal Advisory Committee chartered to provide DOD 
leadership with "independent advice and recommendations on science, technology, manufacturing, 
acquisition processes, and other matters of special interest to the DoD." 
35 More Fight, Less Fuel, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DOD ENERGY 




volumes of energy, particularly petroleum-based fuels, the vulnerability and volatility of 
global supply will continue to raise risks and costs for the armed forces.38   
B.  Budgetary Implications 
 Energy security has significant implications for DOD’s budget.  From the 
Departmental force planning perspective, greater fuel efficiency reduces direct operating 
costs and mitigates the budget effects caused by price volatility.39  The problem arises 
when the cost of fuel greatly exceeds what is called the stabilized rate.40  The rates will 
adjust to reflect the change, but the Services will often have insufficient operation and 
maintenance funds to perform other functions that are normally paid from that budget.41  
This could impact maintenance, training activities and overall readiness, if Congress does 
not intervene to provide supplemental funds.42  For example, in fiscal years (FY) 2006 
and 2007, DOD’s total energy costs exceeded $13 billion, necessitating an additional 
request from Congress for $5 billion in FY 2008 obligational authority43 to ensure it 
could support the increased fuel costs.44  In 2008, the total annual energy bill for the 
DOD was approximately $20 billion, three-quarters of which was petroleum fuels for 
																																																								
38 DEP’T OF DEF., OPERATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY (2011). 
39 Department of Defense Report to Congress on Energy Security Initiatives, DOD ENERGY SECURITY 
TASK FORCE (Oct 2008). 
40 This stabilized rate policy serves to protect customers from unforeseen inflationary increases and other 
cost uncertainties and better assures customers that they will not have to reduce programs to pay for 
potentially higher-than-anticipated prices.  See DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION, Vol 2B, 
Ch.9, June 2004, 9-12. 
41	More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, 
May 2001.	
42 Id. 
43 Congress finances federal programs and activities by providing “budget authority,” which grants 
agencies authority to enter into financial obligations that will result in immediate or future outlays of 
government funds.  From an appropriations law perspective, whether funds, received by an agency, are 
available for obligation without further congressional action is the key question.  See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-464SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW, CHAPTER 2, 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK (2016). 
44 Department of Defense Report to Congress on Energy Security Initiatives, DOD ENERGY SECURITY 
TASK FORCE (2008). 
	 10 
operational energy.45  The DOD estimated that for every $10 increase in the price of a 
barrel of oil, DOD’s operating costs increased by approximately $1.3 billion.46   
 Even now, as a purchaser of fuel on the open market, the DOD is subject to the 
same price volatility experienced by commercial customers making it difficult to 
anticipate and budget for fuel costs.47  Moreover, the DOD’s demand for operational 
energy varies according to the missions assigned and the equipment necessary to execute 
those missions, which often come about unexpectedly (i.e. post-9/11 operations, 
humanitarian relief missions) or involve changes in the magnitude of ongoing 
operations.48  Future financial challenges and risks will continue to be the increasing 
costs for fuel, the shorter-term volatility in fuel prices and trying to avoid creating large 
unfunded obligations.49  
Section 2: Evolution of DOD Energy Conscience 
 To understand the present, it is critically important to reflect on the past.  In order 
to appreciate the DOD’s evolution toward energy consciousness and conservation, there 
were several pivotal studies that occurred at an early stage that were critical to the later 
development of the first OE strategy.50  In what appears to be one of the earliest attempts 
to examine the DOD’s fuel efficiency, in 1999, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
																																																								
45 Department of Defense Report to Congress on Energy Security Initiatives, DOD ENERGY SECURITY 
TASK FORCE (2008). 
46 WILLIAM M. SOLIS, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-523T, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: 
OVERARCHING ORGANIZATION FRAMEWORK NEEDED TO GUIDE AND OVERSEE ENERGY REDUCTION 
EFFORTS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS (2008). 
47 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Fiscal Year 2017 Operational 
Energy Annual Report (2018). 
48 Energy Security and Research, Before the Subcommittee on Defense Senate Appropriations Committee, 
113th Cong. (2014)(statement of Tom Morehouse, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational 
Energy Plans and Programs. 
49 MOSHE SCHWARTZ, KATHERINE BLAKELEY, RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42558, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENERGY INITIATIVES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2012). 
50 Richard J. Kendig, Ashley D. Seaton, Robert J. Rodgers, EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENERGY 
STRATEGY AND ITS CONSIDERATION IN THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS (Sept. 2016)(unpublished MA 
joint thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). 
	 11 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, requested that the Defense Science Board form a 
task force on improving fuel efficiency of weapons platforms.51  Fuel is typically the 
largest single logistic resource by volume required for combat operations.52  At that time, 
just ten years after the Cold War, over 70 percent of the tonnage required to position the 
U.S. Army into battle was fuel.53  Likewise, the Air Force, “the largest DOD consumer, 
spent approximately 85 percent of its fuel budget to deliver, by airborne tankers, just six 
percent of its annual jet fuel usage.”54  Considering this large and costly fuel usage, the 
DSB mused that it would seem only logical for the DOD to instinctively strive for 
continuous improvement in fuel efficiency, but at that time there was no evidence that 
this was a priority, or even a goal.55 
A.  2001 DSB Report  
 The Task Force was asked to identify technologies that improved fuel efficiency 
for the full range of weapons platforms (land, sea and air) and assess their operational, 
logistics, cost, and environmental impacts for a range of practical implementation 
scenarios.56  The report revealed DOD’s high demand for operational energy and shined a 
spotlight on institutional barriers, implementation issues, and a flawed acquisitions 
process with respect to fuel efficiency.57  For example, the report found that DOD based 
its price for fuel only on the wholesale refinery price, and did not include the delivery 
cost to the consumer (i.e. the long logistics tail to get that fuel to a tank, ship or aircraft), 
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which is significantly higher.58  Without understanding or factoring in the true costs of 
fuel delivery and its supporting infrastructure (including equipment, people, facilities and 
other overhead costs), there was no way to incentivize leaders to adopt energy efficient 
practices.59  Moreover, the report lamented the complete lack of interest in fuel and 
energy efficiency by the DOD other than to meet federal executive orders or legislative 
mandates.60 
 The final report was forwarded to senior DOD leadership in May 2001.  The Task 
Force recommended several actions for DOD to adopt in order to develop the analytical 
tools necessary to quantify its warfighting, logistics, and costs related to its weapons 
platforms and acquisition processes: 
(1) Base investment decisions on the true cost of delivered fuel and on 
warfighting and environmental benefits; 
(2) Strengthen the linkage between warfighting capability and fuel logistics 
requirements through wargaming and new analytical tools; 
(3) Provide leadership that incentivizes fuel efficiency throughout the DOD; 
(4) Specifically target fuel efficiency improvements through investments in 
science and technology and system designs; and  
(5) Explicitly include fuel efficiency in requirements and acquisition processes.61 
 
Remarkably, given the early timeframe, the task force also investigated the 
environmental impacts of fossil fuel use, including global climate change.  It presciently 
observed that climate change was an emerging issue that would take on increased 
importance over the coming years and decades, adding that international scientific 
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encouraged DOD to factor in the environmental benefits of reduced fuel consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions into its decisions on investment in fuel efficiency technology.63 
B.  Inaction by DOD 
 The report, while revelatory, was a victim of poor timing in that its 
recommendations were largely ignored once the DOD’s focus shifted to war efforts in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  It took five additional years 
before DOD reviewed its energy problem once more by commissioning two separate 
studies to assess ways to reduce DOD’s dependence on fossil fuels and also to establish 
an energy strategy.64  The studies were reviewed and set aside.  Additionally, in 2006, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) created a department-wide Energy Security 
Task Force for the purpose of monitoring progress of select energy related research and 
development projects.65  The Task Force was supposed to define an actionable 
investment roadmap for lowering DOD’s fossil fuel requirements and developing 
alternate fuels.66  It is unclear what progress, if any, was made by the Task Force.  
Perhaps the one bright spot during this time period was a policy memorandum 
announcing the “Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel Pilot Program,”67 issued in 2007.  Led by 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
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the memorandum declared DOD policy was to factor in the fully burdened cost of 
delivered energy with respect to all its “tactical systems with end items that create a 
demand for energy and to improve the energy efficiency of those systems.”68  However, 
this too was largely ignored.69   
 While the DOD talked a good game, its lack of action on these supposed priorities 
and policy pronouncements spoke louder.  When no further progress ensued, these steps 
amounted to little more than gestures.  This sluggish attention to energy issues and 
growing fuel consumption led to a growing chorus of pleas from experts and senior 
military leaders to address the problem.  After many years of an expensive war effort in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress too, grew frustrated that war planning with respect to 
energy dependence and security was neither understood nor acted upon.  To complicate 
matters, the initiatives to increase energy efficiency were at times stymied by critics who 
were dismissive of the issue, framing it more as an environmental concern rather than a   
national security issue.70  However, the reality on the ground and hard data made the 
problem hard to ignore.   
C.  Data Reveals Undervalued Costs 
 In 2006, the DOD spent over $10 billion on fuel for combat and combat-related 
systems.71  While that price is staggering in scale, the price of fuel alone did not reveal 
the scale of the problem or the true cost.  What became clear was that an undervalued 
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cost related to fuel delivery was the protection required to assure delivery to the point of 
use.72  These costs were difficult to measure and were often not monetary at all, such as 
degraded combat effectiveness, casualty losses and risk to mission.73  For instance, 
reduced combat effectiveness meant forces were tasked to protect supply lines rather than 
actively contribute to combat capability.74  In November 2007, approximately 80 convoys 
carrying fuel and water traveled continuously between Kuwait and Iraq destinations, all 
of which were protected by uniformed forces.75  In June 2008, 44 trucks delivering 
220,000 gallons of fuel to Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan were lost due to attacks and 
other events.76  Troop losses from logistics convoys became so serious that Marine Corps 
Major General Richard Zilmer sent the Pentagon an unprecedented “Priority 1” request 
asking for renewable energy backup.77  This unusual request put fuel convoy issues on 
the national security agenda for the first time. 
 As these problems reached a fever pitch, the DOD reached out once more to the 
Defense Science Board.  It was asked to identify opportunities to reduce fuel demand by 
deployed forces and assess the effects on cost, operations and force structure, and identify 
any institutional barriers to achieving the recommendations of the prior Task Force.78  
The final report, published in 2008, not surprisingly concluded that the DOD faced an 
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operational capability and jeopardized mission success.79  Specifically, the high fuel 
demand (a) required an excessive support force structure at the expense of operational 
forces; (b) created more risk for support operations than necessary; and (c) increased life-
cycle operations and support costs.80  The report issued six findings, only three of which 
are relevant to the discussion of operational energy issues (vice installation-specific).   
 Finding 1 expressed the frustration that the recommendations from the 2001 DSB 
report had not been implemented but were still valid and necessary.81  Thus, the DOD 
needed to re-engineer its business practices to incorporate energy as a factor in all its 
Departmental decisions and adopt a fully burdened cost of fuel methodology to better 
inform its acquisition investment decisions.82  Finding 2 concluded that the DOD lacked 
the “strategy, policies, metrics, information, and governance structure necessary to 
properly manage its energy risks.”83  With no leadership or unifying vision, there were 
few efforts to manage energy demand by operational forces and any decisions made were 
scattered throughout the organization with little accountability or oversight.84  The Task 
Force had concluded that lack of leadership was a root cause of DOD’s energy 
problems.85  Lastly, finding 3 determined that operational risks from fuel disruption 
required demand-side remedies, meaning reduction in operational fuel demand was the 
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not then equipped to make informed decisions on the most effective way forward.  Given 
these findings, the recommendations encouraged DOD to do the following: 
§ Accelerate its efforts to implement energy efficiency Key Performance 
Parameters (KPPs) and use the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) in its 
acquisition decisions as previously recommended by the 2001 Task Force; 
§ Develop a DOD strategic plan establishing measurable goals with clear 
responsibility and accountability.  This comprehensive energy plan should address 
both fixed installations and operational forces; 
§ Invest in energy efficient and alternative energy technologies to a level 
commensurate with their operational and financial value; and 
§ Identify and exploit near-term opportunities to reduce energy use through policies 
and incentives that change operational procedures.87 
 
D.  GAO and Congress Intervene 
 The 2008 DSB report was not the only voice arguing for change at the DOD.  At 
the request of the House Armed Services subcommittee on Readiness, the GAO was 
asked to identify key efforts underway at DOD to reduce its mobility energy demand 
(AKA operational energy) and assess the extent to which DOD established an 
organizational framework to guide and oversee those efforts.88  As with all previous 
studies, the GAO concluded that DOD faced rapidly increasing fuel costs and high fuel 
requirements that placed a significant logistics burden on its forces.89  Given projected 
increases in the worldwide demand for oil and uncertainties about world oil supplies, the 
GAO recommended sustained top leadership attention to long-term energy issues and 
solutions.90  In response to the GAO report, the DOD partially concurred with its findings 
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and recommendations but ultimately concluded that its current structure and Department 
Directives were more than adequate to guide its oversight and policymaking efforts.91 
 At this point, the issue was not that DOD was unaware of the problem, or how 
serious it was.  It was soliciting information, but taking too long to produce results and 
resistant to creating an Executive level position.  Finally, under mounting evidence and 
calls for reform, Congress got involved in 2008.  In a House Report to accompany the 
2008 DOD Appropriations Bill, Congress requested the Defense Energy Security Task 
Force submit a semi-annual report on the initiatives and activities that the DOD was 
taking to promote energy savings and energy efficiency across the Department.92  The 
Committee commended DOD for creation of the Task Force, but expressed concern 
“with the overall lack of support within the DOD to establish aggressive goals and 
timelines to achieve increased energy efficiency.”93  In response, the DOD submitted a 
21-page report outlining its energy security initiatives.  It recognized energy as a limiting 
factor to its operations and laid out an initial strategic plan focusing on fuel optimization 
for mobility platforms and other operational efficiencies.94  It also highlighted initiatives 
by each Service in pursuit of these goals.  The DOD assured Congress that it had a 
“balanced portfolio of energy efforts in place, either in testing or in the planning 
stages.”95 
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 Despite its assurances, and perhaps leery of past inaction, Congress added several 
mandates to the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2009, all 
with the express purpose of improving the way DOD managed its operational energy.  
For starters, despite the push back from the DOD about creating a separate executive-
level position, Congress specifically established a new position titled “Director of 
Operational Energy Plans and Programs.”96  The post, appointed by the President, was 
responsible for consolidated oversight within the Department for energy related issues, 
with direct reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Defense.97  The 
Director was tasked with the development and implementation of an operational energy 
strategy no later than 180 days after confirmation.98  The law required the strategy be 
supported by key metrics, including energy efficiency Key Performance Parameters 
(KPP).99  Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the legislation directed DOD to 
consider fuel logistics support requirements in its program planning and acquisition 
processes.100  It then legally defined the fully burdened cost of fuel concept as “the 
commodity price for fuel plus the total cost of all personnel and assets required to move 
and, when necessary, protect the fuel from the point at which the fuel is received from the 
commercial supplier to the point of use.”101  Lastly, the DOD was required to submit an 
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annual report to Congress detailing progress made on the OE strategy, and to update its 
own OE strategy every five years.102 
Section 3: The 2011 and 2016 OE Strategies 
 
 Before the publication of the first OE strategy, and in response to the increased 
Congressional focus, the DOD published its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review103 
embracing the concept of military energy security for the first time.  It defined energy 
security for the Department as “having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and 
the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs.”104  It 
further committed the DOD to implementing the energy efficiency KPPs and the fully 
burdened cost of fuel, as well as incorporating operational energy considerations into its 
force development, warfighting capabilities and acquisition processes.105  It was under 
this supportive DOD framework that the OE office set to work and started developing the 
Departments inaugural strategy. 
A.  Establishment of OE Plans and Programs Office 
 Sharon Burke was appointed and confirmed in 2010 as the DOD’s first-ever 
assistant secretary of defense for operational energy plans and programs.  Her daunting 
mission was to preside over DOD’s fundamental shift in its relationship with energy and 
create an energy strategy for all the services to follow that would improve capabilities, 
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cut costs and lower risk through better OE accounting, planning and management.106  
This challenge was made all the more difficult because up until that point no specific data 
had been kept.  In her words, “You can’t manage what you can’t measure,” so one of her 
first steps in creating the program was asking the research and engineering communities, 
both in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and across the military departments 
to assess the way they were currently using OE in order to look for gaps.  The mindset of 
the new office was to start small with targets aimed at improving its ability to measure 
energy.107   
 The other initial priority for the new office came direct from SECDEF Gates 
himself, which was to make it crystal clear that the first priority was existing operations 
and deployed forces.108  Thus the first goal was to get rapid fueling solutions to current 
operations; and later to figure out how DOD best develops the future military force with 
those energy efficiency improvements in mind.109  The other challenge was to overcome 
any cultural hesitancy to selling “green technology” to the military.  To do this, the office 
consistently and repeatedly enforced the notion to military commanders that while energy 
was a cost item, it was also a unique capability in its own right—one that could provide 
more range and more endurance.110  The thought was that once the military commander 
recognized the energy savings and relevance to the mission there would be little 
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resistance.111  Unfortunately, this proved to be a naïve but optimistic strategy, which 
never quite permeated the entrenched cultural reluctance to “go green.” 
B.  2011 OE Strategy and Implementation Plan 
 The first OE strategy was meant to set the direction for DOD.  It was released in 
June 2011, followed up by an implementation plan with mid, near and long-term targets.  
It aligned itself with the goals outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review—
demand reduction, increased diversity and security of supply, and then, finally 
incorporating OE considerations into future planning.112  To achieve these goals, the 
strategy outlined a threefold approach—demand, supply and future force planning.113  
The first prong was entitled “More Fight, Less Fuel: Reduce Demand for Energy in 
Military Operations.”  This prong addressed the growing military appetite for energy, 
dependent upon supply lines that were costly, vulnerable to disruption and a burden on 
warfighters.114  The means for reducing demand and improving efficiency were both 
materiel and non-materiel according to the strategy.115  The DOD components were to 
invest in new technologies and equipment but also in new practices and behaviors—
again, a cultural shift in thinking.  To achieve this reduced demand, the implementation 
plan laid out several targets aimed at measuring OE consumption by establishing 
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performance metrics and baselines “using all available data on actual energy 
consumption in support of military operations,” and encouraging innovation.116 
 The second prong was called “More Options, Less Risk: Expand and Secure 
Energy Supplies for Military Operations.”117 The strategic goal was to diversify and 
secure military energy supplies.118  The report noted that by the end of 2010, DLA-
Energy119 was moving 40 million gallons of fuel per month into Afghanistan alone.120  
Assuring lawmakers and DOD leaders that that commitment would continue was critical, 
however, the strategy also emphasized the importance of balancing that commitment with 
parallel efforts to develop and deploy alternative energy, with a focus on energy that 
could be generated or procured locally or regionally near deployments.121  Maintaining 
this balance was also important to assure skeptics that military energy security would 
enhance and not sacrifice other operational capabilities.  The target created for this prong 
was the promotion and development of a DOD alternative fuels policy as well as 
establishing a departmental-wide alternative fuels investment portfolio.122 
 The third prong was more forward, future focused entitled “More Capability, Less 
Cost: Build Energy Security into the Future Force.”123  DOD would have to consider 
energy security in its strategic planning and force development in order to provide energy 
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security and enhanced warfighting capability for U.S. forces well into the future.124  Up 
until that time, energy was not generally incorporated into strategic planning.  The 
strategy clearly explained: “This is not to say that fuel demand should be more important 
than lethality, survivability, or any other performance parameters that guide DOD choices 
about how to equip military forces.”125  Rather, the strategy set a light-handed tone of 
merely taking “energy into account in order to make informed decisions about the 
choices and the tradeoffs in equipping and employing forces.”126  The targets established 
in the implementation plan for this prong directed DOD to integrate OE considerations 
into the full range of planning and force development by incorporating energy security 
considerations into requirements and acquisition.127  Lastly, the 2011 OE strategy also 
created the Defense Operational Energy Board to serve as the primary body to charter 
and receive work related to the Implementation Plan and oversee progress on 
implementation of the strategy.128   
C.  DOD Energy Policy 
 In 2014, two notable things happened which changed the face of the OE program 
office and forced a reassessment of the foundational 2011 policy.  First, the DOD 
released a long-overdue update to its 1991 “Energy Management Policy.”  The new 
guidance complemented the 2011 OE strategy by keeping energy security on the agenda.  
Specifically, it stated that DOD policy was  “to enhance military capability, improve 
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energy.”129  It pledged action in six different areas: (a) improve the energy performance 
of weapons systems, platforms, equipment and products, and their modifications; (b) 
diversify and expand energy supplies and sources, including renewable and alternative 
fuels; (c) ensure that energy analyses were included in DOD requirements, acquisition, 
planning and budgeting; (d) manage energy-related risks to operations, training and 
testing; (e) develop and acquire technologies that meet DOD energy needs and (f) 
educate and train personnel in valuing energy as a mission essential resource.130  
Additionally, the policy also captured the merger of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Operational Energy Plans and Programs and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
for Installations and Environment to create the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, 
Installations and Environment.  The ASD (EI&E) became the principle advisor to the 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics131 on matters relating to 
energy, installations, and environment and the principal advisor to the Secretary of 
Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding operational energy plans and 
programs.   
 The second notable event in 2014 was the publication of the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, which announced the DOD’s “repositioning” or rebalance to the Asia Pacific 
region in response to new centers of power—i.e. China’s rising regional influence and 
expansionist foreign policy.132  To address this shift, the Quadrennial Defense Review 
directed the military services to prepare for an array of new security challenges in the 
Asia Pacific region and adjust its thinking regarding capabilities and capacity 
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accordingly.133  Thus, the ASD (EI&E) office released the 2016 strategy within this 
context. 
D.  2016 OE Strategy 
 The revised OE strategy provided assurances that the provision of energy to the 
warfighter would remain vital, but that the evolving operational environment (i.e. pivot to 
Asia Pacific) and the lessons learned from the previous four years necessitated a revised 
approach.134  Notably, the report contained an honest assessment of its successes to date 
but also discussed areas for improvement.  First, the strategy spoke to its improved 
analytical capability.  Relative to 2011, it stated that the DOD better understood the 
implications of energy use in its systems, operational plans, and concepts of operation, 
however, a significant barrier to improving tactics, techniques and procedures was the 
limited understanding of the Department’s use of energy and the operational implications 
of that energy use on the warfighter.135  For example, while the DOD’s understanding of 
its OE consumption had improved significantly since 2012, its understanding of energy 
use by ground forces had lagged.136 
 Second, the DOD had made good progress in diversifying its energy supplies to 
reduce risk by pursuing renewable energy opportunities at contingency bases and 
conducting testing and certification of fuels and platforms to prepare for bulk purchases 
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of cost competitive, drop-in137 alternative fuels for operational use.138  This was reflected 
in two DOD policies adopted in 2012 and 2015 regarding alternative fuel investments.139  
Though a positive step, this initiative was nascent and the use and experimentation with 
alternative fuels by the military departments was not widespread.140  Moving forward, the 
report noted the “tyranny of distance” that would challenge the projection of power into 
the Asia Pacific region with increased reliance upon naval fleets and aviation, which 
would require more fuel than the ground-oriented operations in the Central Command 
theater.141  For example, intra-theater lift in Afghanistan requires a fraction of the fuel 
that would be required for intra-theater lift in the Pacific.142   
 Another recognized area for focused improvement was the next generation of 
weapons platforms and concepts of operation, which often required more energy than 
their predecessors.143  Thus, the cultural shift that the 2011 OE strategy had set out to 
create, of having an energy conscious mindset, had not yet infiltrated acquisitions and 
planning.  The strategy specifically commented on anti-access/area-denial144 weapons 
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(A2/AD) like mines, ballistic and cruise missiles, and advanced air defenses, which 
threaten the assured delivery of energy across air, land and sea domains.145  While these 
weapons are more capable in terms of speed, survivability, stealth, payload, and 
maneuverability, they often require more energy—highlighting the persistent tension 
between energy efficiency initiatives at the cost of increased capability. 
 With these challenges in mind and the refocus on another, more distant theater of 
operations, the 2016 OE strategy focused on three objectives.  First, increase future 
warfighting capability by including energy throughout future force development.146  
Similar to prong three from the 2011 strategy, the goal was to continue investments in 
innovation but do a better job at institutionalizing energy supportability analyses in 
capability development, prior to developing the Energy Key Performance Parameters.147  
The second objective was to identify and reduce logistics and operational risks from OE 
vulnerabilities and third was to enhance mission effectiveness of the current force 
through updated equipment and improvements in training, exercises, and operations.148  
In summary, the new strategy focused on upgrades to DOD’s current equipment to 
improve energy use, while also improving its energy behavior.  Ultimately, the 2016 
strategy seemed less of a different approach, but rather a reaffirmation of the objectives 
established in 2011.  Additionally, the revised strategy took some criticism for not 
including specific energy reduction targets149, but the report deflected this criticism 
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saying “operational requirements and needs of the Joint Force should define our 
objectives, not just reduction in energy use.”150 
Section 4: OE Today – Status, Progress, Continuing Challenges  
 As required by section 2925(b) of title 10, the DOD’s Operational Energy office 
submits an annual report to Congress providing information on operational energy 
demands, progress in implementing the strategy, investments in alternative fuels and 
support to contingency operations.151  The most recent annual report released in July 
2018 provides data for the 2017 fiscal year.  What is perhaps most illuminating is the 
historical data showing the Department’s OE consumption since metrics were required to 
be recorded.  The data starts from fiscal year 2012 and continues to the present with 
estimations for future fiscal years.  The level of energy use has been steady since 
FY2013, and according to DOD “reflects relatively consistent operations tempo.”152  See 
Figure 1.1 (borrowed from the annual report). 
Figure 1.1: DOD Operational Energy Demand by Service (million barrels) 
 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18e FY19e 
Army 16.1 12.7 10.1 7.3 7.1 7.6 8.0 8.0 
Navy 31.5 28.4 28.2 28.5 28.5 28.4 26.6 26.3 
Air Force 55.7 47.8 48.6 52.0 49.6 49.0 50.5 50.0 
Marine Corps 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Other DOD 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.4 1.4 
Total 
Demand 
103.9 89.8 87.4 88.6 85.7 85.5 87.0 86.2 
Expenditures, 
$ Billions 
$16.3 $14.8 $14.0 $14.1 $8.7 $8.2 $9.0 $9.0 
 
Overall, the DOD’s OE demand peaked in FY 2007, and then declined by 30 percent 
from that peak in FY 2014.  Many of these changes in energy are attributed to operational 
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tempo in U.S. Central Command, responsible for overseeing the operations in the Middle 
East.153 
 Today, the energy picture looks much different for the U.S. now than it did a 
decade ago.  The so-called shale revolution—the surge since 2010 in U.S. production of 
unconventional shale oil and gas through hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal 
drilling of shale rock—has turned the U.S. into a leading oil and natural gas producer, 
making it a bona fide player in global fossil fuel markets.154  According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, in 2017, U.S. net imports of petroleum from foreign 
countries were equal to about 19 percent of U.S. petroleum consumption.155  This marked 
the lowest percentage since 1967.156  In late November 2018, the U.S. actually exported 
more crude oil and petroleum products than it imported for the first time since 1991.157 
 While overall this reduction in foreign oil imports and U.S. production of oil and 
gas is a positive sign that may bolster the nation’s energy security, it does little to reduce 
the DOD’s operational energy footprint.158  The reason being is that operational forces do 
not ship fuel from the U.S. into theater but buy it from sources near theater as a way to 
reduce transportation costs.159  Thus, DOD operations are entirely dependent on the 
commercial global petroleum market for its supplies; and this will continue to impose 
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risks.160  The DOD purchased nearly 55 percent of its fuel outside the U.S. in FY 2017.161  
Given continued U.S. presence in the Middle East and the Navy’s mission to protect the 
free flow of commerce (to include oil) globally, the strategic implications of fuel 
consumption are every bit as important despite greater output nationally.  Moreover, the 
global supply will always be vulnerable to supply chain disruptions due to catastrophic 
natural disasters (i.e. Hurricane Katrina or Superstorm Sandy) or price shocks.162 
A.  Immediate Successes in OE 
 When the initial OE strategy was released in 2011 with the priority focused on 
deployed forces, there were some immediate successes, particularly aimed at efficiency 
improvements at contingency bases and FOBs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  One of the first 
focus areas was “rapid fielding of equipment in theater,” which meant efforts to 
streamline the deployment of energy efficient equipment to reduce in-theater fuel 
consumption.163  The first target was efficiency improvements to environmental control 
units such as heating, ventilation and air conditioning.164  One of the big energy 
consumers on the battlefield is shelters, typically tents.165  The Army sprayed foam 
insulation on the outside of tents in both Iraq and Afghanistan to achieve about a fifty 
percent cut in their energy consumption.166  Additionally, hybrid power generation 
methods were tested such as a combination of microgrids, solar generation, diesel 
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generators and batteries.167  Another example of energy innovation in theater was tactical 
biorefineries, which converted waste products in the field into biofuels for FOBs.168 
 Back in Washington, another successful component of the OE program was the 
creation of the Operational Energy Capability Improvement Fund (OECIF) which began 
in fiscal year 2012 with the goal of funding innovation that would improve the OE 
performance of U.S. forces while creating institutional change within the Department.169  
Its initial budget of 19.5 million focused on reducing the energy load of expeditionary 
outposts and transforming waste into energy.170  In fiscal year 2019, its budget had 
increased to $40.9 million still focused on investing in OE science and technology 
initiatives.171  Each year OECIF programs are selected from Service and Combatant 
Command proposals that align with the DOD’s latest strategy and support a specific 
OECIF theme for that fiscal year.172 
B.  Service Specific Initiatives 
 Each Service branch also spelled out their own policies and initiatives in the 
inaugural OE era, many of which included an emphasis on changing their underlying 
culture.  As the DOD’s largest OE consumer, the Air Force aimed its energy initiatives at 
reducing its service’s energy costs and at reducing the budgetary impact of volatility in 
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fuel prices.173  Specifically, it aimed to reduce its consumption of aviation fuel and to test 
and certify all its aircraft and systems on a 50:50 alternative fuel blend by a target date.174  
The Marine Corps initiated an expeditionary energy program investing in solar-hybrid 
stationary power systems, flexible, mobile solar panels and reducing the number and size 
of batteries necessary for the deployed Marine.175 It laid out its Marine Expeditionary 
Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan in March 2011 declaring that the more efficient 
use of energy and water resources must be part of the warrior ethos.176 Likewise, the 
Army also sought to change its “warrior ethos.”  It identified “Surety, Survivability, 
Supply, Sufficiency, and Sustainability” as core characteristics of its energy security 
strategy.177  It also acknowledged the effects of climate change and global resource 
constraints as major forces of change.178  As such, the Army said it could “no longer 
assume unimpeded access to the energy, water, land and other resources required to train, 
sustain and deploy” its forces; and felt compelled to foster a more resource-informed 
culture.179  
 The Navy set out to transform its energy use with two priorities in mind: energy 
security and energy independence.  In 2009, then Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus 
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issued five aggressive goals for naval energy reform.180  Those goals included: increasing 
alternative energy use operationally and ashore by 2020; sailing the “Great Green Fleet” 
by demonstrating a “green” strike group powered by biofuels; reducing non-tactical 
petroleum use in the commercial fleet by 50 percent; and transforming its process of 
acquisition, whereby evaluation of energy factors would be mandatory when awarding 
contracts for systems and buildings.181  Though progress was made on a number of these 
initiatives, many inside and outside the Department of the Navy considered the goals an 
overreach at the expense of readiness and capability.  The fanfare that led to the 
aggressive energy goals was too far too fast, alienating many commanders that were told 
to operate more efficiently without clear instruction as to how.182  This was one factor 
that led to the concern about more expensive energy efficient technology upgrades. 
C.  New Administration 2017  
 The arrival of a new Administration brought significant changes in leadership and 
Department priorities.  For OE, these changes included a new Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L) and a new Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and the Environment (ASD(EI&E).183  The 
new staff conducted a review of the 2016 OE strategy and confirmed that energy did 
indeed remain a fundamental enabler of military capability, and the ability of the U.S. to 
project and sustain power depended upon the assured delivery of this energy.184  This was 
echoed in the Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy, which articulated the 
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Administration’s view of the threats and challenges facing the Nation.  It stated that a 
great-power competition, namely Russia and China, had now re-emerged as the central 
challenge to U.S. security.185  It outlined a security environment characterized by 
strategic competition and a “lethal and disruptive battlefield, combined across domains 
(air, land, sea, space, cyberspace), and conducted at increasing speed and reach.”186  
Since these multi-domain risks challenge the assured delivery of energy to the joint 
forces, the OE office reaffirmed the warfighter need to reduce the “tether” of fuel, while 
still increasing the capability of forces on land, air and sea.187   
D.  Re-organization of the OE office 
  
 In summer 2018, internal reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
reshuffled the directorates previously listed as part of the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment.  They were re-structured 
under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment.188  Under this 
new structure, Environment and Energy are two separate offices and operational energy 
falls under Energy.  While still adhering to the 2016 OE strategy, the stated mission of 
the new office is to enhance military capability, readiness, and resilience for the 
warfighter, while mitigating risk and cost in the supply and use of energy in operations 
and training.189  Toward that end, it identifies four primary lines of effort (which appear 
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redundant to the current OE strategy): (1) future force requirements; (2) wargaming, 
modeling, and simulation; (3) innovation and (4) warfighter support.190  
 The significance of this re-organization indicates a demotion in the importance of 
the OE program.  The original criticism from outside organizations like DSB and GAO 
specifically targeted the lack of coherent leadership to manage energy demand across 
DOD leading to a lack of oversight and accountability.191  Recall that the enabling 
legislation in 2008 created a Director position of OE policy and plans that would directly 
report to the Secretary of Defense.  Now the position is multiple steps below what it 
previously was in the chain of command.  Moreover, the biography of the current 
executive in the position focuses on installation energy only, leaving operational energy 
more as an afterthought.192  Other signs that the OE momentum has waned since the 
change in Administration is that the Defense OE Board has not met in two years.193 
E.  Continuing Challenges for OE 
 
 The practical reality is that despite a drawdown of forces in the Middle East, 
missions will continue to persist across the full spectrum of military operations.  The fuel 
demands for those activities—on land, at sea and in the air—will increase; and the fuel 
relied upon is still almost exclusively traditional sources of petroleum.194  Worse still is 
that OE, for the most part, has not caught up with new acquisitions, and the latest 
weapons systems continue to require higher and higher energy demands, albeit with ever 
																																																								
190 Id. 
191 REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, MORE CAPABLE WARFIGHTING THROUGH REDUCED FUEL 
BURDEN (2001). 
192 DEP’T OF DEF., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SUSTAINMENT, Leadership, 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Bios.html#IE (last visited May 7, 2019). 
193 Interview with James Caley, Director for Operational Energy, Department of the Navy, (Mar. 22, 2019). 
194 James Grant, Renewables: Bridging the U.S. Energy Security Gap, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
COUNCIL, DEFENSE DOSSIER, December 2018, Issue 23. 
	 37 
increasing combat capability.195  This reliance on fuel continues to keep U.S. forces 
vulnerable threatening energy security.  Particularly, asymmetric threats like anti-access 
and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities will continue to challenge the assured delivery of 
fuel to combat forces.196  For example, a major concern as the focus shifts to power 
competition from Russia and China is that such a rival could block or constrain the 
movement of opposing forces into a given theater of operations, including through 
disruption of fuel supplies (energy denial).197  Lessons of the last eighteen years of war 
have not been lost on potential adversaries, who are increasingly developing or acquiring 
capabilities that threaten U.S. ability to project and sustain this power.198   
 In addition to these challenges, OE faces another hurdle of trying to re-gain 
traction under very different circumstances than what existed a decade ago.  The 
combination of a changed global energy landscape, a less supportive administration, and 
lagging institutional commitment has taken its toll.  Today, the relative cost of energy is 
lower, contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have decreased (particularly the 
fuel convoys to support those missions), and Administration priorities are much different.  
The Trump administration is less supportive of renewable energy and alternative fuels 
generally and its priorities are focused more on readiness goals to counter threats from 
Russia and China.  Likewise, some in Congress have even been openly skeptical of 
energy efficiency targets calling them arbitrary goals, “environmentally based mandates 
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[that] have squandered too much money on ‘greening’ the military.”199  These same 
critics often argue that these energy efficient goals are too costly and detract from 
capability, despite the fact that energy efficient contracts must be cost competitive and 
“diversifying fuel supplies, stabilizing fuel costs and reducing overall energy 
consumption translates into greater combat capability.”200   
 Lastly, the OE program will continue to experience challenges in the face of a few 
other harsh realities.  First, most of the Department’s operations occur outside the U.S., 
and DOD will continue to buy energy overseas to simplify supply chains, limit costs and 
increase flexibility.201  Second, global energy will continue to flow through a relatively 
small number of chokepoints.202  Thus, the Middle East will remain a major source of oil 
for nations across the globe, requiring U.S. military attention.  Given all of these 
challenges, one of the best ways forward is to more definitively link energy security with 
the momentum following the issue of climate change.  The next section will detail the 
DOD’s early recognition of the problem and trace its efforts to define the extent of the 
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Section 5: Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap and Nexus 
  
 While the term and conceptualization of “operational energy” is only a decade 
old, climate change as a looming concern has been recognized by the defense community 
for more than two decades, if not earlier.  One of the earliest references was the May 
2001 DSB report that focused on technologies to improve fuel efficiency for weapons 
platforms.203  While revealing the DOD’s high demand for operational energy, it also 
cited the issue of climate change emissions and their causal link to greenhouse gases, 
noting specifically that carbon dioxide released from the burning of fossil fuels 
represented 94 percent of DOD greenhouse gas emissions.204 Acknowledging the DOD’s 
emission contribution, the report called for improving the Department’s energy efficiency 
and correcting its high fuel consumption patterns as a way to address these environmental 
security issues.205  It was not until several years later, however, when the DOD classified 
climate change not just as an environmental security concern but also a national security 
challenge.   
 In October 2007, DOD released its first ever collective maritime strategy for the 
Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard called “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower.”206  It was the first U.S. military strategy document to explicitly refer to 
climate change as a national security concern, recognizing its devastating effects as an 
amplifier of social instability and regional crises.207  Just two years later, the Navy would 
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launch its own task force dedicated to studying how climate change could affect maritime 
operations.208  Around this same time, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Military 
Advisory Board released two separate reports on national security—one highlighted the 
threat of climate change, while the other emphasized the risks and deleterious effects of 
American energy dependence on foreign oil.209  The report on climate change said it 
constituted a threat multiplier to existing security risks in some of the most volatile 
regions of the world.210  The report on U.S. energy dependence, and more narrowly the 
DOD’s high energy consumption, called for a change noting that the “best approaches to 
energy, climate change and national security may be one and the same.”211  Lastly, both 
the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews dedicated substantial discussion to 
climate change and energy security noting their challenges were distinct but inextricably 
linked.212  The reports stated that climate change would affect the DOD in two major 
ways—by shaping the operating environment, the roles and missions the organization 
would undertake, and by the adaptation and mitigation required to offset its impacts on 
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A.  2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap 
 
 To spur further action from federal agencies at large, not just DOD, President 
Obama implemented two Executive Orders (EO) focused on sustainability, energy 
reduction and climate change.  The first, EO 13514,214 sought to establish “an integrated 
strategy towards sustainability” to make reduction of greenhouse gas emissions a priority 
as well as reduced energy consumption and expanding use of alternative and renewable 
energy sources.215  As part of its mandate, it ordered each federal agency to create a 
Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan (SSPP) outlining greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets and pollution prevention efforts, among many others.216  In a DOD 
memo implementing the EO, the USD(AT&L) said commitment to this effort was critical 
and also consistent with the defense mission because “climate change, petroleum-based 
energy dependence, and national security” were interrelated global challenges.217 
 The Department’s first SSPP was issued on August 26, 2010.  The 99-page report 
stated that a strategic approach to climate change and energy was a high priority for 
DOD, such that its primary path to reaching its sustainability goals was to reduce the 
Department’s reliance on fossil fuels through energy efficiency and renewable energy.218  
That said, a glaring omission was operational energy, which was exempt from the EO 
emission reduction targets, “since providing immediate support for the warfighter 
remained the Department’s highest priority.”219  Nevertheless, the DOD said reducing the 
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energy demands of operational forces was a major focus of the Department’s efforts to 
cut energy consumption, since overall, the military imperative of reducing operational 
energy demand would likely be a major contributor to the Department’s greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions.220  
 The second Executive Order, EO 13653, Preparing the United States for the 
Impacts of Climate Change, directed federal agencies to undertake actions to enhance 
climate preparedness and resilience.221  It was in response to this EO that the DOD 
published its 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap.  In foreword comments 
provided by then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the Secretary said it was the DOD’s 
responsibility to think ahead and plan for a wide range of contingencies in order to 
provide for U.S. security.222  It focused its efforts in two areas: adaptation, or efforts to 
plan for the changes that are occurring or expected to occur; and mitigation, efforts that 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.223  It laid out three adaptation goals: (1) identify and 
assess the effects of climate change on the Department, (2) integrate climate change 
considerations across the Department and manage associated risks, and (3) collaborate 
with internal and external stakeholders on climate change challenges.224  To help meet 
those goals, the Department concentrated its efforts in four areas: plans and operations, 
training and testing, built and natural infrastructure, and acquisition and supply chain.  
Also, as part of its assessment, the DOD pledged to complete a comprehensive 
assessment of all installations to assess the potential impacts of climate change on 
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missions and operational resiliency, and to develop and implement plans to adapt as 
required.225  Accordingly, DOD issued Directive 4715.21, Climate Change Adaptation 
and Resilience, which assigned roles for implementing climate change adaptation and 
resilience at bases and in operations.226  
B.  Impacts of Climate Change on DOD and National Security 
 
 Like energy, DOD looks at climate through the lens of its mission—protecting 
national security.  Changes in climate will shape the operating environment and the types 
of missions required.227  From a DOD perspective, climate change presents two types of 
threats—direct and indirect.228  The direct threats are those to military installations and 
infrastructure as a result of sea level rise and/or other extreme weather events.229  This is 
the area that has received the most attention since the impacts from extreme weather 
events are already quite visible— California wildfires that closed Marine bases in 
September 2018; Hurricane Florence decimated Camp Lejeune and caused damage to 
Fort Bragg and military installations across North Carolina in September 2018;230 
Hurricane Michael’s devastation of Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, October 2018 
which also damaged 17 F-22 stealth fighter jets; and severe flooding and damage to 
Offutt Air Force Base, home of U.S. Strategic Command, in Nebraska, in March 2019.231  
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In 2008 a National Intelligence Council report found that more than 30 U.S. military 
installations were already facing elevated levels of risk from rising sea levels.232  By 
January of 2019, the number of priority installations that would feel potential climate 
related impacts (i.e. recurrent flooding, drought, desertification, wildfires, and thawing 
permafrost) had increased to 79.233  Specifically, in a report to Congress, the DOD found 
that about two thirds of the 79 military installations surveyed in its review of climate 
vulnerabilities were already facing risks, including recurrent flooding at 15 bases, 
drought exposure at 43 bases and wildfire risk to 36 bases.234  
 The other type of threat from climate change are those indirect, or intangible, 
factors—the geopolitical and global economic effects such as mass migrations, resource 
scarcity and increased humanitarian disasters.235  In this way, DOD has recognized that 
climate change acts as a catalyst for instability and conflict, often called a “threat 
multiplier.”236  These effects will “aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, 
environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can 
enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence.”237  The start of the Syrian civil war, 
for example, started because of a 10-year drought exacerbated by climate change.238  
Another example of climate change impacting geopolitical relations is in the changing 
Arctic region.  Not only has the melting sea ice created a new operational environment, 
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but the area is now rife with tension as Russia and China compete to expand their reach 
and influence.239   
 These direct and indirect threats from climate change impact national security in a 
myriad of ways.  Perhaps the most serious impact is on military readiness.  When a base 
or training ground is damaged or destroyed, this directly impacts military readiness, 
where readiness is measured by having sufficient numbers of personnel who are properly 
trained, equipped and organized to execute a mission.240  For example, extreme 
temperatures and weather events cause military trainings to be delayed, moved or 
otherwise complicated.241  Deploying the National Guard to respond to humanitarian-type 
assistance events both nationally and internationally is also straining military resources 
and readiness.242  Thus, climate change impacts the physical environment in which U.S. 
military forces will operate; it poses increasing risks to DOD’s infrastructure; and makes 
already unstable situations worse.  With regard to the latter, these situations in particular 
must be addressed quickly otherwise more opportunistic countries could move in to 
exploit the instability to their advantage, and quite often to the detriment of U.S. 
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C.  The Nexus of Climate Change and Energy Security 
 
 Energy security and climate security are two sides of the same coin.  Heavy 
reliance on fossil fuels creates economic and security vulnerabilities and burning them 
spurs climate change.244  Both of these factors come with associated costs.  Since climate 
change acts as a threat multiplier it is sure to generate many more natural disasters, 
forcing the U.S. military to make ever more difficult strategic decisions about where, for 
what purposes, and with what tradeoffs U.S. military assets will be deployed.245  
Increased missions for military assets means more operational energy is required.  
Similarly, energy limitations also constrain the military’s ability to project power since a 
FOB lasts only as long as its energy supply.246    
 Though this inter-relationship is clear, linking the two issues will not be easy nor 
come without considerable debate and political stamina.   Congress and the DOD often 
make a distinction between energy and climate change as well as between fixed bases 
located within the U.S. and operational platforms.247  This likely occurs for three reasons.  
First, for those remaining skeptics of climate change, it is easier (politically) to address 
the issue when there are tangible impacts in the present—i.e. the wildlfires, hurricanes 
and floods already wreaking havoc on DOD infrastructure.  Congress, in particular, has 
been very active; holding hearings and requiring DOD to submit reports on the resiliency 
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of military installations and operations in the face of climate change.248  Second, 
Congress and DOD often divorce the two issues for the same reason that the SSPP 
exempted operational energy from its emission reduction targets—that environmental 
limits, no matter how intrinsically good, will always be viewed as a constraint on military 
flexibility and a burden on the warfighter. 249  In a recent congressional hearing calling 
for more leadership on climate change, Representative Mark Green (R-TN) argued that 
the Defense Department had but one purpose—“to kill our enemies”—and that any effort 
to distract from that focus, by addressing the climate change issue, would lead to the 
future loss of American lives.250  He proceeded to identify a long list of concerns about 
the readiness of U.S. troops and equipment, and concluded that Congress should “not use 
a single dollar of the DOD budget to address the climate change issue.”251  Third, climate 
change has become a politically charged, partisan issue.  As such, the DOD often tries to 
remain apolitical and may consider climate security a political fight best avoided.252 
 It is clear that work remains to overcome the cultural resistance and institutional 
reluctance to embrace the nexus that underlies energy security and climate security.  It is 
not necessarily the nexus that is in dispute, but the combined approach to reach mutually 
complementary solutions.  Most everyone can agree that any action to address climate 
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change must also protect America’s economy, environment and national security253, but 
that is easier said than done, particularly in a divided Congress.  However, there is a role 
for both energy and environmental considerations when it comes to operational 
equipment and activities.  Regardless of the approach, the DOD must get ahead of both 
issues before climatic events overcome indecision forcing the military to deal with the 
consequences.254  The ability to move forward on both energy security and climate 
change efforts will be difficult for a variety of a reasons, but particularly because the 
Trump administration has openly questioned climate science and vigorously supports the 
fossil fuel industry.  The next section will examine the Trump administration’s impacts 
on the DOD’s OE and climate agenda, and whether the administration’s efforts actually 
undermine these goals. 
Section 6: Trump Administration Impacts 
	 	
	 The policy and priority shifts from the Obama administration to the Trump White 
House could not have been more stark in terms of environmental regulation.  The energy 
and environmental sectors, in particular, felt the impacts of the upheaval most since 
President Trump initially targeted environmental rules deemed overly burdensome to the 
fossil fuel industry, including major Obama-era policies aimed at fighting climate 
change.255  For starters, beginning in 2017, the Trump administration revoked and 
replaced EO 13653, Preparing the U.S. for the Impacts of Climate Change, with EO 
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13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth.256  The new EO declared 
it was in the national interest to promote the “clean and safe development of our Nation's 
vast energy resources, while at the same time avoiding regulatory burdens that 
unnecessarily encumber energy production, constrain economic growth, and prevent job 
creation.”257  It did not address climate change, except to rescind the nation’s existing 
Climate Action Plan and also rescind Council on Environmental Quality guidance 
directing agencies to consider climate change in their National Environmental Policy Act 
reviews for certain types of federal projects.258   
 Other major policy shifts came when President Trump announced that the U.S. 
would withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement,259 an ambitious global action plan to 
fight climate change, signed by the U.S. in 2015 along with nearly 200 other countries.260  
Though technically by the terms of the agreement, the U.S. cannot officially exit the 
treaty until November 2020, the optics alone were chilling.261 As part of the withdrawal, 
President Trump immediately stopped payment on the additional 2 billion that had been 
promised under President Obama to finance the Green Climate Fund.262  Lastly, and most 
telling is that the White House National Security Council has never acknowledged that 
climate change is a national security threat, contrary to the last four presidential 
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Administrations.263  Quite the opposite, when introducing his first National Security 
Strategy in December 2017, President Trump argued that the true threat to national 
security was not climate change but environmental regulations that interfered with U.S. 
economic and energy dominance.264   
 As such, the White House is reportedly exploring the idea of creating its own 
climate panel, led by an adviser who rejects mainstream climate science, to challenge the 
scientific consensus that the burning of fossil fuels is the main driver of global warming 
and revaluate whether climate change poses risks to national security.265  This received 
strong criticism from over 58 senior retired military and national security leaders in a 
letter submitted to the White House denouncing the idea.  They argued that, “imposing a 
political test on reports issued by the science agencies, and forcing a blind spot onto the 
national security assessments that depend on them, will erode our national security.”266  
Indeed, in testimony to the House Oversight and Reform committee, former Secretary of 
State John Kerry, a signatory to the letter, stated, “We have no time to waste debating 
alternative facts only to be forced to invest years more trying to reestablish trust in the 
real ones.”267   
 The disparity between the Trump administration’s perspective and the growing 
consensus around climate science globally, to include U.S. assessments is unsettling.  
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According to a former Trump administration official, the issue is not climate change 
specifically but energy access.268  The Trump administration would prefer to see science 
divorced from energy policy to ensure universal access to all energy types, particularly 
fossil fuels.269  Publicly, administration officials may acknowledge that climate change 
has an impact on national security, but the issue is where it ranks on the list of threats and 
Administration priorities.  According to EPA’s Administrator Andrew Wheeler, people 
should be less worried about climate change, than say access to clean drinking water, 
since its impacts are 50-75 years away.270  Yet this contradicts a major report issued by 
the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which predicted 
atmospheric warming will reach 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit around 2040.271  This same report 
warned that countries had about 12 years to stop greenhouse gas contributions or face 
irreversible effects of climate change.272  The White House dismissed the report as 
depicting a worst-case scenario.273 
A.  Climate Change Consensus and Momentum 
 
 In addition to the October 2018 IPCC report, there have been a number of reports 
and vocal activists calling for increased attention to the issue of climate change and 
global warming.  In November 2018, the Fourth National Climate Assessment  (NCA) 
was issued by the U.S., a report that is required by law every four years.274  Thirteen 
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federal agencies and 300 experts from around the country contributed to the report and 
painted a grim picture of projected climate change effects by the middle of the century.275  
The report warned that “Earth’s climate is now changing faster than at any point in the 
history of modern civilization, primarily as a result of human activities.”276  Moreover, 
the report said that neither global efforts to reduce emissions nor regional resilience 
efforts currently approach the scale needed to avoid substantial damage over the coming 
decades.277  This report was bolstered by two other key announcements.  In a joint 
statement, NASA and NOAA revealed that 2018 was the fourth warmest year in a 
continuing warming trend since the 1880s.278  NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies Director said: “This warming has been driven in large part by increased 
emissions into the atmosphere of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases caused by 
human activities.”279  The other major announcement was from a U.S. led team of climate 
scientists writing in the journal Nature Climate Change, which said the evidence for man-
made global warming had reached a “gold standard” level of scientific certainty.280 
 With the science all but certain, action within the U.S. Congress and activism 
around the globe has also increased.  The 116th U.S. Congress established a House Select 
Committee on the Climate Crisis in December 2018.  Its mandate is “to investigate, 
study, make findings, and develop recommendations on policies, strategies, and 
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innovations to achieve substantial and permanent reductions in pollution and other 
activities that contribute to the climate crisis.”281  Additionally, the House Oversight and 
Reform Committee announced in April 2019 that it will launch its own series of hearings 
to identify opportunities for advancing concrete solutions to climate change.282  U.S. 
Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez introduced her so-called “Green New Deal” 
outlining an ambitious program of investments in clean-energy jobs and infrastructure, 
meant to address climate change and transform not just the energy sector, but the entire 
economy.283  The speed and intensity of the media attention and activist energy 
embracing the plan have surprised many, including those involved.284  Indeed, the Green 
New Deal “has thrust climate change into the national conversation...and created an 
intense and escalating bandwagon effect…which seems to have tapped into an enormous, 
untapped demand for climate ambition.”285   
 This momentum shows no signs of stopping and even has a global youth 
following like the Sunrise Movement, which started in the U.S. in 2017 to stop climate 
change and create jobs in the process.286  The other successful political movement is led 
by 16-year-old Greta Thunberg, a Swedish activist who started her Fridays for the Future 
protests outside the Swedish Parliament.287  Frustrated by the lack of attention paid to the 
climate change threat, she initiated a school strike every Friday to protest.  Unexpectedly, 
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her actions inspired others around the globe becoming an international youth movement 
on a surprisingly large scale.  Tens of thousands of students in nearly 300 towns and 
cities from Australia to Uganda to Japan joined her protest.288   
 This flurry of activism and global awareness is inspiring to many, though some 
critics have warned that “climate change fanaticism” is actually the larger threat.289  
While skeptics might downplay or even dismiss these events as short-lived, these issues 
are unlikely to fade from the national or international conversation any time soon given 
the high probability of increased natural disasters and melting sea ice creating global 
impacts.  Regardless of whether the momentum is here to stay, the DOD should take 
advantage of the increased attention to double down on the linkage between energy 
security and climate change to ensure both programs continue unchallenged.  The next 
section addresses whether the Trump administration’s policies have any measurable 
effect on DOD’s initiatives. 
B.  DOD policy in the era of Trump 
 In testimony before the House Armed Services subcommittee on readiness, at a 
hearing entitled “Ensuring Resiliency of Military Installations and Operations in 
Response to Climate Change,” retired Rear Admiral David Titley explained that the 
Pentagon was between a rock and a hard place.290  He said DOD officials by and large 
know what they need to do to address climate change, but felt constrained given White 
House dynamics where the White House does not want to hear about climate change or 
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worse, openly questions its scientific basis.291  As a result, some changes at DOD have 
been more apparent than others.  For instance, the annual Strategic Sustainability 
Performance Plan required by (now revoked) EO 13514 has not been published since FY 
2016, despite the fact that the sustainability steering committee established under the EO 
continues to exist and allegedly implements its goals, including the annual report.292  
Second, the Defense Operational Energy board has also not met in two years since the 
Trump Administration took over.  These are just two examples of areas where the DOD 
has allowed current administration views to impact its mission, and there are likely more 
examples across the defense enterprise.  Yet the DOD is not in a position where it can 
allow misguided White House policy to dictate its priorities, especially when it comes to 
preparation for climate change impacts.   
 Despite White House efforts to dispute climate change by attacking the science 
and weakening environmental protections,293 the Defense Department has gone on record 
multiple times acknowledging the national security implications of climate change.  It 
just recently reiterated that “the effects of a changing climate are a national security issue 
with potential impacts to DOD missions, operational plans and installations.”294  The 
Pentagon further said it would “continue to focus on ensuring it remains ready and able to 
adapt to a wide variety of threats—regardless of the source—to fulfill its mission to deter 
war and ensure the nation’s security.”295  Thus, while it may not seek the spotlight, the 
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DOD has become the “unequivocal validator of climate science.”296  This explains why 
“noise” from the White House is relatively muted in the face of decades old defense and 
intelligence assessments confirming the climate change threat and continued 
Congressional requests for information related to DOD vulnerabilities and mitigation 
responses.  Despite DOD’s insulation from White House rhetoric, however, there are still 
obstacles that DOD must overcome internally in order to succeed in both areas of energy 
security and climate change.  The following section outlines several recommendations 
that DOD should consider and adopt as it moves forward, particularly ahead of the next 
OE strategy anticipated in 2021. 
C.  Recommendations 
 
 Since the future of DOD’s energy security is linked to climate change, identifying 
approaches to address both is critical.297  The following recommendations encourage 
DOD to: (1) affirmatively link the triad of energy, climate and national security into the 
next OE 2021 strategy; (2) embrace DOD’s unique role as a technological innovator and 
continue energy efficiency improvements; (3) create a senior Energy and Climate 
Security position to ensure that there is accountability and a unifying vision; and (4) rise 
above the partisan bickering and stay on message—notably, that addressing both energy 
security and climate security enhances military readiness and capability.  The two are not 
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(1) OE 2021 Strategy should affirmatively connect the dots of Energy and Climate 
Security to National Security 
 
 Energy security and climate security are two sides of the same coin.  The DOD 
should not move forward on either climate change or energy security without firmly 
establishing the inter-linking relationship between the two.  Though this might be a 
political gamble given how partisan the issue of climate change has become, it is 
ultimately the prudent course of action for the long term.  Additionally, the momentum 
and awareness surrounding climate change generally will bring renewed attention to 
critical issues like energy consumption, dependence on foreign oil, and carbon outputs.  
One way to better track DOD’s progress toward sustainability is reissuing the 
Department’s Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan outlining its greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets and pollution prevent efforts, except this time, the DOD 
should strive to also include analysis of operational energy factors.  Likewise, the next 
OE strategy should seek to promote energy solutions that improve DOD’s energy security 
while also reflecting climate change realities.  Messaging matters, so focusing on the 
benefits of energy conservation to military capability, and of climate policy to national 
security may make swallowing both less of a bitter pill for critics and also help drive 
behavioral changes in the climate change context.298 
(2) Tune out White House rhetoric, Continue Research and Innovation of Energy 
Efficient Technologies  
 
 The DOD has a historical role as a technological innovator and incubator of ideas.  
It has played a major role in the development of at least three of the most important 
energy innovations of the last 75 years: the nuclear reactor, the gas turbine/jet engine, and 
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the solar photovoltaic (PV) cell.299  It has also been the driver for many non-energy 
innovations as well, including radar, satellites, GPS, computers and the Internet.300  As a 
result, DOD is uniquely situated to enhance its readiness and resiliency through effective 
energy policy and programs.301  This year, the DOD will invest $1.6 billion in research, 
development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) that is directly related to energy.302  
Specifically, roughly half of the services’ spending on operational energy initiatives, as 
defined and tracked by OSD, is going to RDT&E.303 These ongoing and future efforts by 
DOD to increase the generation of renewable energy, and to institutionalize energy 
efficiency into all DOD operations, will improve the military’s resiliency to 
vulnerabilities like climate change.304  As such, the DOD should continue to understand 
its use of energy at all levels of operations, and know its carbon bootprint.305 
 The ultimate goal is to build a military force that uses energy as a strategic 
advantage rather than as a burden.306  History has shown that with each significant 
revolution in technology, the nations that have adopted it most effectively have achieved 
profound military advantages.307  As President Trump predicts the next major conflict 
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will arise from major power competition with either Russia or China, it is imperative that 
the U.S. strive for a leaner, more efficient military.  One scholar has even referred to this 
competition as a Green Arms Race, a movement focused on a more efficient fighting 
force, a reduction in the worldwide reliance on fossil fuels, investments in green energy 
technologies and the creation of a new, more stable world order of mutually assured 
sustenance.308  Under this rubric, the once disparate approaches to address climate 
change, energy dependence, and national security become one and the same. 
 (3) Leadership, as it was intended by Congress 
 The recommendations from the 2001 and 2008 DSB reports are just as relevant 
now as they were then with regard to leadership.  Recall that the Task Force had 
concluded that lack of leadership was a root cause of DOD’s energy problems because 
there was no unifying vision and little accountability or oversight.309  As a corrective 
measure Congress weighed in via the NDAA to establish a new executive-level position 
for Operational Energy Plans and Programs.  This post, appointed by the President, was 
responsible for consolidated oversight for energy related issues, with direct reporting to 
the Secretary of Defense.310 Over time, this post gradually merged with other offices and 
has now been subsumed under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment energy 
office.  This demotion in stature is significant.  There must be sustained high-level 
attention for energy security issues and climate change.  The position must be at a senior 
enough level so that that person can appropriately contextualize the risks as they pertain 
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to other strategic priorities.311  Establishing a senior Energy and Climate Security position 
would go a long way toward ensuring these issues were received and addressed at the 
highest levels.  Incidentally, this was also a recommendation advanced by the Climate 
and Security Advisory Group to the incoming Trump administration back in 2016.312 
 The other benefit to sustained, high-level leadership is the ripple effect it would 
have throughout the institution, perhaps incentivizing leaders to look for more energy 
efficiencies in their business practices but also work to overcome any remaining cultural 
reluctance to “go green.”  The Pentagon itself is a barrier to these goals given climate 
change and other resource challenges are generally not seen as “real” security issues.313  
Moreover, these issues generally take a backseat to DOD’s more immediate priorities of 
active combat operations, modernization needs, unfolding cyber and high tech wars and 
overall budget uncertainties.314  Nevertheless, while cultural shifts take time, elevated 
leadership would go a long way toward achieving the desired end state. 
(4) DOD should maintain Consistency of Message in Response to Partisan Fights 
  
 Climate change should be a matter of pragmatism, not politics said former 
Secretary of the Navy Chuck Hagel in his forward to the DOD’s Climate Change 
Adaptation Roadmap, adding that “neither politics, ideology nor uncertainty regarding 
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the threat should get in the way of sound planning.”315  Unfortunately, like many 
substantive issues in the current political environment, climate change has fallen victim 
to common political posturing.  An issue that should be examined based on the soundness 
of its scientific findings has receded from the arena of informed public discourse and 
debate.316  While the DOD cannot control how partisan the issue of climate change has 
become, it should not be forced to conceal its efforts to prepare for climate change related 
risks simply because the White House or some in Congress fail to appreciate the 
seriousness of the threat. 
 The DOD can and should continue to be apolitical and consistent in its 
evaluations of the threat.  It should also continue to stress that leadership on both energy 
security and climate change is about military readiness and capability, factors that strike 
at the core of the defense mission, which should never be held hostage to partisan 
bickering.  Moreover, the DOD holds an advantage in this fight in that numerous 
independent surveys have shown that the military continues to retain the full trust and 
confidence of the American people.317  As a result, the DOD is uniquely able to work 
across multiple interest and partisan groups in pursuit of the wellbeing of the U.S.318 The 
bottom line is that regardless of politics or changing presidential Administrations, the 
DOD has a “responsibility to prepare” given the unprecedented foresight of the threat and 
its mission to protect the nation.319 
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Section 7: Conclusion  
 
 Over the last decade, the DOD has come a long way in understanding its energy 
consumption patterns and addressing the associated costs and vulnerabilities that flow 
from those choices.  Though driven by Congress, the establishment of the OE office and 
recognition of the fully burdened cost of fuel was a major step forward for DOD.  It 
ignited an energy conscious mindset across all Service branches and led to innovations 
that directly cut energy demand in forward locations.  Yet despite these investments in 
time, money and policy pronouncements, multiple changes occurred which directly 
impacted the leadership and momentum on operational energy.  The combination of a 
changed global energy landscape, a less supportive administration, and lagging 
institutional commitment took its toll. 
 While OE, and broader energy security goals, were sidelined by other DOD 
priorities, the Department’s attention to climate change has been persistent.  DOD has a 
long track record recognizing climate change as a national security threat and engaging 
its leaders to adapt and mitigate the direct and indirect threats to infrastructure and 
operations.  While these efforts have been complicated by the Trump Administration’s 
stance on climate change and fossil fuels, ultimately the DOD has successfully insulated 
itself from the rhetoric.  No matter the current Administration’s policies, efficient energy 
use and employing lower carbon fuel sources are essential both for operational security 
and to help avoid the national security impacts associated with climate change.  The best 
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approach to energy security, climate change and national security is truly one and the 
same. 
 
 
